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PROTECTING SPEECH V. PROTECTING CHILDREN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
JUDICIAL REFUSAL TO ALLOW LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN THE REALM OF MINORS
AND INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is "the most ubiquitous of information networks," where "users
connect to each other and to a dazzling array of online services and products with
staggering speed and frequency."' While the Internet offers potentially endless
educational and cultural benefits, it also raises grave concerns in terms of its
potential to deliver inappropriate and dangerous material to children. The presence
of sexually explicit material on the Internet is no secret. Disseminating pornography
over the internet is a 2.5 billion dollar-a-year industry, consisting of over 4.2
million pornographic websites and approximately 372 million pornographic pages.
2
Although the societal value of Internet pornography for adult users is perhaps
arguable, the statistics regarding Internet pornography and children-a group that
does not benefit from exposure to sexually explicit materials-trigger much greater
concerns. Children in the twelve to seventeen-year-old age group are the dominant
consumers of Internet pornography, and the average age of an individual's first
exposure to Internet pornography is eleven.3 Furthermore, eighty percent of fifteen
to seventeen-year-olds have had multiple exposures to hard-core pornography, and
ninety percent of eight to sixteen-year-olds have viewed pornography online, most
often while doing their homework.4 Research also indicates that certain Internet
pornography providers aim their products directly at children by linking their sites
to the names of popular children's television and movie characters.5
While research confirms children have access to pornography on the Internet,
courts have struck down statutes aimed at prohibiting the electronic dissemination
of sexually explicit materials.6 Courts have based their decisions in those cases on
First Amendment and Commerce Clause principles.7 Most recently, in Southeast
Booksellers Ass "n v. McMaster,' the United States District Court for the District of
1. FRED H. CATE, THE INTERNET AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: SCHOOLS AND SEXUALLY EXPLICIT
EXPRESSION 1 (1998).
2. Jerry Ropelato, Internet Pornography Statistics, INTERNET FILTER REVIEWS (2005),
http://internet-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/intemet-pornmography-statistics.html.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2003) (striking down
part of a Vermont statute regulating dissemination of pornography on the Internet); ACLU v. Johnson,
194 F.3d 1149, 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's injunction against
enforcement of a New Mexico Internet dissemination statute); Cyberspace Commc'ns, Inc. v. Engler,
142 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830-31 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding entire Michigan Internet dissemination statute
unconstitutional); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding a New York dissemination statute unconstitutional).
7. See supra note 6.
8. 371 F. Supp. 2d 773 (D.S.C. 2005).
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South Carolina declared a state statute prohibiting the dissemination of harmful
materials over the Internet to minors unconstitutional. 9 The district court's ruling
in Southeast Booksellers followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Ashcroft v. ACLU, in which the Court found a similar dissemination statute to be
unconstitutional." These rulings leave a number of questions unanswered
concerning the future of the interplay between fundamental constitutional principles
and the governmental interest in protecting children from explicit materials on the
Internet.
Part II of this Note analyzes Southeast Booksellers and its reliance upon the
constitutional analysis of Ashcrofl v. ACLU. The remaining Parts describe specific
flaws in the courts' analysis in Southeast Booksellers and Ashcroft v. ACLU.
Specifically, Part III argues the courts failed to apply the appropriate level of
scrutiny to the dissemination statutes and thus furthered the confusion over
obscenity and pornography, leaving legislators with virtually no guidance in
drafting dissemination statutes. Part IV argues both cases misapplied the "least
restrictive means" test by comparing the government's statutory regulation of
Internet speech to the private action of using filtering devices on the receiving end.
Part V examines whether Internet technology has rendered the Supreme Court's
current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine unworkable. Finally, Part VI
concludes with a brief consideration of the difficulty state and federal legislatures
now face in regulating the Internet.
II. THE SOUTHEASTBOOKSELLERS DECISION
A. The Statute
The South Carolina dissemination statute stated:
A person commits the offense of disseminating harmful material
to minors if, knowing the character or content of the material, he:
(1) sells, furnishes, presents, or distributes to a minor material that
is harmful to minors; or (2) allows a minor to review or peruse
material that is harmful to minors.12
Material was "[h]armful to minors" under the statute if it depicted "sexually explicit
nudity or sexual activity . . . that, taken as a whole," tended to have three
characteristics. 3 First, "the average adultperson applying contemporary community
standards would find [the material to have] ... a predominant tendency to appeal
9. Id. at 788.
10. 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
11. See Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 776-77.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-385(A) (2003), invalidated by Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster,
371 F. Supp. 2d 773 (D.S.C. 2005).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-375(1) (2003).
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to a prudent interest of minors in sex. ' Second, "the average adult person
applying contemporary community standards would find [the material] ... patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community concerning what is
suitable for minors."15 And third, "a reasonable person" would find that the
material, "taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors."16
The controversy in Southeast Booksellers centered on an amendment former
South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges signed in 2001 concerning the definition of
"'material."" 7 Under the amendment, the definition of material included 'pictures,
drawings, video recordings, films, digital electronic files, or other visual depictions
or representations but not material consisting entirely of written words.""' 8
Pursuant to the italicized language, the definition of material included digital
electronic files 9 and thus covered obscene Internet postings. Because the statute
provided criminal sanctions for those disseminating harmful materials to minors,
the district court examined whether the amended definition encompassed the
plaintiffs' actions."
B. The Plaintiffs and Their Complaint
The majority of the plaintiffs in Southeast Booksellers were companies that
"represent artists, writers, booksellers, and publishers who use the Internet to
engage in expression, including graphic arts, literature, and health-related
information."'" The plaintiffs maintain websites containing information on
"obstetrics, gynecology, and sexual health; visual art and poetry; and other speech
which could be considered 'harmful to minors' in some communities. 2 The
plaintiffs argued the South Carolina statute violated the First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause by prohibiting adults "from viewing and sending
constitutionally-protected images over the Internet."' The plaintiffs "brought a pre-
enforcement constitutional challenge[] to permanently enjoin the operation" of the
South Carolina statute. 4
14. Id. § 16-15-375(1)(a).
15. Id. § 16-15-375(1)(b).
16. Id. § 16-15-375(1)(c).
17. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776 (D.S.C. 2005) (quoting S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-375(2) (2003)).
18. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-375(2) (2003)).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-375(2).
20. Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 775.
21. Id. at 775.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 776. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that in terms of their First Amendment claim "the
Act, as a content-based restriction on speech, [could not] survive strict scrutiny and [was]
unconstitutionally overbroad because it substantially infringe[d] on protected speech of adults." Id.
Concerning their Commerce Clause claim, the plaintiffs stated that "the proscription constitute[d] an
unreasonable and undue burden on interstate and foreign commerce and subjected] interstate use of
the Internet to inconsistent state regulation." Id.
24. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (D.S.C. 2005).
2006]
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C. The Parties' Summary Judgment Motions
In February 2003, the defendants moved to dismiss the suit, claiming the
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the statute on the basis of the First
Amendment and the Commerce Clause.2" The district court denied the initial
motion, and the parties moved for summary judgment.26 The court held the
summary judgment motions in abeyance while the United States Supreme Court
decided Ashcroft v. ACLU"7 because of the similarities between the challenged
statutes.28 Once the Supreme Court issued its opinion in June 2004, the Southeast
Booksellers court denied both summary judgment motions.29 The court based its
decision on "the Ashcroft Court's admonition that a full trial on the merits might
be necessary... in order to allow for adequate development of the record with
respect to the question of plausible, less restrictive alternatives."3" The district court
noted at the time of the July Order, "the record simply did not contain sufficient
evidence regarding the effectiveness of less restrictive alternatives."'" Subsequently,
the plaintiffs and defendants filed updated motions for summary judgment,
attaching expert opinions concerning the possibility of equally effective-but less
restrictive-means of protecting children from explicit material on the Internet. 2
Based on this evidence, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and enjoined the operation of the South Carolina statute. 3
D. The Reasoning of the Southeast Booksellers Court
The district court struck down the statute and granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment because the statute violated both the First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause.34 In holding the statute unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, the district court indicated that the statute, as a "content-based
regulation of speech,.. . must be struck down unless the State [could prove] that
it [was] narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest."35 The district court
explained that "[t]he purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is restricted no
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 542 U.S. 656 (2004). The statute at issue in Ashcrofl was the Child Online Protection Act,
which penalized the "knowing posting, for 'commercial purposes,' of World Wide Web content that
is 'harmful to minors."' Id. at 661. The statute "provide[d] an affirmative defense to those who
employ[ed] specified means to prevent minors from gaining access to the prohibited material on their
website." Id. at 662. Thus, though worded somewhat differently than the South Carolina statute, the
Child Online Protection Act had the same effect in requiring the content providers to restrict the access
of their potential viewers.
28. Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 777.
31. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 777 (D.S.C. 2005).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 788.
34. Id. at 786, 788.
35. Id. at 781.
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further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to assure that
legitimate speech is not chilled or punished." '36
Applying strict scrutiny, the Southeast Booksellers court noted "[tihere is no
doubt that the regulation of minors' access to obscene material is a compelling
interest."37 Thus, the district court was left to determine only whether the statute
was narrowly tailored to advance that interest. The district court stated, "A law is
narrowly tailored if (1) it employs the least restrictive means to achieve its goal, and
(2) there is a nexus between the government's compelling interest and the
restriction."38
The defendants argued the statute represented the least restrictive alternative
because of the availability of "minimally burdensome measures" for preventing
children from accessing the plaintiffs' websites.39 The defendants relied on
measures such as age verification40 and labeling" "as means to save the Act from
constitutional infirmity."42 The district court noted that other courts "have
unanimously concluded that these measures are far too burdensome, and chill
adults' ability to engage in, and garner access to, protected speech." 43
The district court identified three problems with age verification measures.
First, age verification "deters lawful users from accessing speech they are entitled
to receive" by potentially compromising the user's anonymity." Second, "age
verification is problematic because it requires the use of a credit card, which not all
adults have."45 Third, age verification would "pose significant costs for Internet
speakers who have to segregate harmful and non-harmful material, and update and
maintain [the] system."'
The district court also discussed the problems with the defendants' labeling
proposal.47 The district court treated labeling much like age verification and found
that "[t]he State's labeling proposal creates many of the same constitutional burdens
on protected speech. '4' The district court further observed labeling had been
36. Id. at 778-79 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004)).
37. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 781 (D.S.C. 2005).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 781-82.
40. Age verification systems either require the Internet speaker to "accept[] and verifly] a credit
card before allowing access" or utilize a third party website to provide passwords or identification
numbers to users who supply credit cards. Id. at 782.
41. Labeling is a method by which "Internet speakers label every webpage with harmful material
with text such as 'XXX' or 'obscene for minors,"' thus enabling "[o]perating systems/web browsers
[to] be programmed to block such material." Id. at 782.
42. Id. at 782.
43. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 782 (D.S.C. 2005) (citing Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881 (1967); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2004)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 783.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 784.
48. Id.
2006]
5
Jordan: Protecting Speech v. Protecting Children: An Examination of the J
Published by Scholar Commons, 2006
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"squarely rejected by the Supreme Court as ineffective in Reno [v. ACLU] .' 49 In
rejecting labeling as insufficient and overburdensome, the district court echoed the
Reno Court's concern that the provider would have no way of verifying the end
user actually blocked the labeled material.5"
After determining that age verification and labeling methods would impose a
significant burden on free speech, the district court examined the effectiveness and
restrictiveness of another method: filtering.5 In so doing, the district court relied
on the Ashcroft v. ACLU Court's earlier endorsement of filtering as a less
burdensome means of protecting children from Internet pornography:
"[Filters] impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving
end, not universal restrictions at the source. Under a filtering
regime, adults without children may gain access to speech they
have a right to see without having to identify themselves or
provide their credit card information. Even adults with children
may obtain access to the same speech on the same terms simply
by turning off the filter on their home computers. Above all,
promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any
category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is
eliminated, or at least much diminished."52
Thus, because filtering provided a far less burdensome alternative to the South
Carolina dissemination statute, the Southeast Booksellers court concluded that "the
State's contention that the Act is the least restrictive alternative is wholly without
merit.
53
The district court held that the South Carolina statute failed strict scrutiny
"because the State . . . failed to prove that [the statute was] more effective at
achieving the State's interest in protecting minors than Plaintiffs' proffered less
restrictive alternative of filtering. 54 The district court discussed additional ways in
which filters are more effective than age verification or labeling systems." First,
"filters can prevent minors from seeing all pornography, not just pornography
posted to the web from America."56 Second, filters do not allow minors to access
pornography with their own credit cards.57 Finally, "filters can be applied to all
forms of Internet communications, including email, not just communications
49. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 789 (D.S.C. 2005) (citing Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881 (1997)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 784-85.
52. Id. at 785 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 785 (D.S.C. 2005).
56. Id. at 785 (citing Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667).
57. Id. (citing Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 668).
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available via the web.""8 Because the defendants did not satisfy their burden of
showing the South Carolina statute employed the least restrictive method to achieve
its goal of protecting minors, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs on their First Amendment claims.59
After invalidating the statute on First Amendment grounds, the district court
held the statute also violated the Commerce Clause.60 The statute, according to the
district court, "places an undue burden on interstate commerce by regulating
commerce occurring wholly outside of South Carolina.",6 ' Furthermore, the district
court stated that "the Act constitutes an invalid indirect regulation of interstate
commerce because the burdens it imposes on interstate commerce are excessive in
relation to the local benefit conferred., 62 Thus, the court determined that, even
without a consideration of the First Amendment issues, the plaintiffs were entitled
to summary judgment because the statute violated the Commerce Clause.63
In addressing the constitutionality of the two dissemination statutes and the
validity of both decisions, it is necessary to recognize that the decision in Southeast
Booksellers is the unavoidable consequence of the Supreme Court's Ashcroft
decision. Therefore, arguing Southeast Booksellers was "incorrect" is pointless.
Nevertheless, Southeast Booksellers is worth critiquing because it illustrates the
local effect of Ashcroft and the difficulty that South Carolina and other states may
face in future attempts to regulate electronic speech.
III. THE COURTS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
Because the strict scrutiny standard applies only when a statute burdens a
fundamental right,6 the statutes at issue in Southeast Booksellers and Ashcroft
deserved strict scrutiny only if they burdened speech protected by the First
Amendment. In both cases, the courts avoided differentiating between protected
and unprotected (non-obscene and obscene) speech by simply stating that strict
scrutiny applied. The following sections explain the obscenity standard and show
58. Id. at 783 (citing Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 668).
59. Id. at 786.
60. Id.
61. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 787 (D.S.C. 2005).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 788.
64. The Supreme Court created this analytic framework in the famous Carolene Products footnote
in which the Court wrote that a "narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
[may be necessary] when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick and holding consensual sexual conduct is encompassed within the concept of liberty, a
fundamental right that must be subjected to strict scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)
(holding strict scrutiny only applies if a law burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (indicating
there is no fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy and thus not applying
strict scrutiny).
2006]
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how the courts erred in using strict scrutiny, furthering the confusion surrounding
First Amendment jurisprudence.
A. The Difference between Pornography and Obscenity
The United States Supreme Court decided its first case concerning the degree
of First Amendment protection afforded material with sexual content in 1957. In
Roth v. United States,6" the Court held obscenity does not fall within the First
Amendment's protection.' With this standard set, the Court faced the difficult task
of defining "obscenity. 67 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Roth, noted,
"All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties."6 Justice Brennan then
determined that obscenity depends on "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest."69
The current obscenity standard comes from the Supreme Court's 1973 decision,
Miller v. California,70 in which Chief Justice Burger narrowed the Roth test:
We acknowledge ... the inherent dangers of undertaking to
regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to
regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. As a result,
we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works
which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be
specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or
authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to
works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way,
and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.7'
By adding additional requirements to the Roth "prurient interest" test, the Miller
Court made it less likely that material containing sexual content would qualify as
obscene and fall outside the First Amendment's protection. Though the Court failed
to set an extremely clear standard, the Miller test has endured and persists as the
current standard.
65. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
66. Id. at 485; see also NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE
SPEECH IN AMERICA 284-88 (1980) (discussing the impact of the decision in Roth, in which the Court
held that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
67. HENToFF, supra note 66, at 284.
68. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
69. Id. at 489.
70. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
71. Id. at 23-24 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 57: 489
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss3/6
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
B. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
Both the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in Ashcroft72 and the South
Carolina statute in Southeast Booksellers73 covered obscene material under the
Miller standard. The text of the statutes mirror the Miller standard, with the
exception of the language that specifically identifies minors.7" Instead of
immediately applying strict scrutiny, which applies only when constitutionally-
protected rights are at stake,7" both courts initially should have determined whether
the statutes regulated speech protected by the First Amendment. The courts,
however, immediately defined the statutes as "content-based" prohibitions and thus
used strict scrutiny without analyzing the nature of the regulated speech.76 The
courts must have assumed that at least some of the speech the statutes outlawed was
not obscene.
While each court quickly determined that strict scrutiny applied, the dissents
in Ashcroft and a pragmatic consideration of the statutory language in that case
indicate the strict scrutiny determination was at least premature, if not incorrect.
Justice Scalia, in his brief dissent in Ashcrofl, stated the majority erred in applying
strict scrutiny to COPA.77 Justice Scalia noted, "Nothing in the First Amendment
entitles the type of material covered by COPA to that exacting standard of
review."7" He emphasized the Court has held "'commercial entities which engage
in "the sordid business of pandering" by "deliberately emphasiz[ing] the sexually
provocative aspects of [their non-obscene products]".., engage in constitutionally
unprotected behavior."' 79 Stating that the material covered by COPA was
constitutionally unprotected, Justice Scalia concluded that "[s]ince this business
could, consistent with the First Amendment, be banned entirely, COPA's lesser
restrictions raise no constitutional concern."8 Thus, Justice Scalia asserted that
COPA was constitutional because it did not cover non-obscene speech and should
not have been struck down on First Amendment grounds.
72. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661-62 (2004).
73. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775-76 (D.S.C. 2005).
74. Justice Breyer, in his Ashcroft dissent, noted the similarity of the language in COPA with the
language discussed in Miller. Ashcrofi, 542 U.S. at 679 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The South Carolina
statute in Southeast Booksellers also resembled the Miller language. Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d
at 775-76. Thus, the statutes and Miller all require that the material appeal to the "prurient interest" of
the viewer and that the material lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller, 413
U.S. at24.
75. See supra note 64.
76. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660; Southeast Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
77. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entn't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 831 (2000)). The
Court in Ginzburg v. United States set the standard for using strict scrutiny for non-obscene material
deliberately marketed to accentuate the sexually provocative details of the product. The Court upheld
convictions under an obscenity statute for individuals who distributed non-obscene materials through
the mail but emphasized the sexually provocative aspects of those materials. Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463,473-75 (1990).
80. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 676 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2006]
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Justice Breyer provided a more careful analysis of the speech regulated by
COPA and determined the Act covered "legally obscene material, and very little
more."'" Nevertheless, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that strict scrutiny
was the appropriate standard for COPA. 2 He asserted that "[g]iven the inevitable
uncertainty about how to characterize close-to-obscene material," the Act could
apply to "a limited class of borderline material that courts might ultimately find is
protected."83 Justice Breyer perceived a potential sliver of constitutionally-protected
material the Act might cover, and thus determined strict scrutiny was the correct
standard."
The majority inAshcroft and the district court in Southeast Booksellers applied
strict scrutiny because they assumed the statutes covered at least some non-obscene
speech. Presumably, the courts focused on the statutes' references to the "prurient
interests" of "minors" and the lack of "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors,"85 to conclude that some material obscene for minors
would be non-obscene for adults, and thus constitutionally protected. While this
distinction seems apparent on its surface, as Justice Breyer noted, the difference is
insignificant.86 Justice Breyer indicated "the addition of [the statutory language
referring to minors] to a definition that would otherwise cover only obscenity
expands the statute's scope only slightly."87 He buttressed this assertion by noting
that "the material in question.., must, first, appeal to the 'prurient interest' of, i.e.,
seek a sexual response from, some group of adolescents or postadolescents (since
young children normally do not so respond)." 8 Further, as Justice Breyer wrote,
"material that appeals to the 'prurient interest[s]' of some group of adolescents or
postadolescents will almost inevitably appeal to the 'prurient interest[s]' of some
group of adults as well."89 Justice Breyer drew a similar conclusion with respect to
the statute's covering only material lacking "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors."" He wrote, "one cannot easily imagine material that
has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for a significant group of
adults, but lacks such value for any significant group of minors. '
Justice Breyer's point is particularly apparent when one considers the
distinction between a minor and an adult. While it is easy to consider the divergent
prurient interests of a thirty-year-old adult and a twelve-year-old minor, the
distinction regarding prurient interests and recognition of redeeming social values
81. Id. at 678 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 677.
83. Id. at 681-82.
84. Id.
85. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-385 (2003). The language in the Federal COPA is identical. See
47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000), invalidated by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2000).
86. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 679 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
91. Ashcrofi, 542 U.S. at 679.
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is much less clear between a seventeen-year-old and an eighteen-year-old.92 Thus,
the statutes' potential chilling effect on protected adult speech is less clear than the
courts indicated, and whether the statutes regulate any speech beyond obscenity is
uncertain. The differing opinions of the Justices in Ashcroft reveal the Court's
continuing struggle with the distinction between protected sexually explicit speech
and obscenity. In both Ashcroft and Southeast Booksellers, the courts should have
engaged in a more in-depth consideration of the statutes' effect on protected (non-
obscene) speech.9 3 Such a consideration could have clarified obscenity
jurisprudence and provided a workable standard for legislatures seeking to curb
dissemination of pornographic materials to children.
IV. THE COURTS MISAPPLIED THE "LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS" TEST
After the Ashcroft and Southeast Booksellers courts determined that strict
scrutiny was appropriate for determining the constitutionality of the Internet
dissemination statutes, the courts had to apply the standard. To meet strict scrutiny,
a statute must be "narrowly tailored" to advance a "compelling interest" of the
government.94 "A law is narrowly tailored if (1) it employs the least restrictive
means to achieve its goal, and (2) there is a nexus between the government's
compelling interest and the restriction."95 To satisfy the least restrictive means
element of the narrowly tailored standard, the government must prove that any less
restrictive alternatives proposed by the plaintiff would "'not be as effective as the
challenged statute. '"'96 Thus, the government cannot meet its burden simply by
proving that the challenged statute "has 'some effect in achieving [the legislature's]
goal."' 97 While the courts in Ashcroft and Southeast Booksellers correctly
recognized a compelling interest in protecting minors from Internet pornography,
they misapplied the least restrictive means test in holding that the respective
statutes failed to pass strict scrutiny.
A. The Compelling Government Interest
Beginning with the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Ginsberg v. New York,9"
courts have determined that the government has a vested interest in regulating
92. The statutes at issue define "minor" differently. COPA identifies a minor as "any person under
17 years of age," 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(7), and the South Carolina statute defines a minor as "an individual
who is less than eighteen years old." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-375(3) (2003).
93. Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV 248, 353-63 (2004).
94. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding city council's
requirement that contractors award thirty percent of subcontracts to minority-owned businesses was not
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227,
233 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Strict scrutiny requires the law in question to be 1) narrowly tailored to 2) promote
a compelling government interest.").
95. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 781 (D.S.C. 2005).
96. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004)).
97. Id. (quoting Ashcrofl, 542 U.S. at 681).
98. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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materials that are harmful to children." Justice Brennan described the need for
government regulation in this area:
"While the supervision of children's reading may best be left
to their parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance
cannot always be provided and society's transcendent interest in
protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of
the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and
proper for a state to include in a statute designed to regulate the
sale of pornography to children special standards, broader than
those embodied in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination
of such material to adults." 1°°
Justice Brennan indicated that "the State has an interest 'to protect the welfare of
children' and to see that they are 'safeguarded from abuses' which might prevent
their 'growth into free and independent well-developed ... citizens.".. A recent
Fourth Circuit decision specifically recognized a similar interest in protecting
minors from accessing harmful materials on the Internet. °2 The courts in Ashcroft
and Southeast Booksellers, therefore, correctly decided that the government has a
compelling interest to protect children from harmful Internet materials." 3
B. Narrow Tailoring and the Least Restrictive Means Test
Unfortunately, the courts' analyses of the narrowly tailored element of strict
scrutiny was flawed in both Ashcrofl and Southeast Booksellers. The analysis in
both opinions began, and ended, with an examination of the first prong of the
narrowly tailored test-the least restrictive means test."'4 In applying this test, the
Ashcroft Court erred in comparing the challenged regulation to the gamut of
possible alternatives.0 5 Specifically, the Court compared the government action of
99. Id. at 640-41; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (holding that
protecting minors from exposure to offensive language on the radio is a compelling government
interest.); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 234 (4th Cir. 2004) ("It is clear that the government's
interest in protecting minors from sexually explicit Internet materials is compelling.").
100. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334-35 (1965)).
101. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
102. See PS1Net, 362 F.3d at 234 ("It is clear that the government's interest in protecting minors
from sexually explicit Internet materials is compelling.").
103. The Ashcroft Court implicitly held that protecting children from Internet pornography is a
compelling interest by applying the strict scrutiny analysis. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,
665-66 (2004). The Southeast Booksellers court expressly stated that "[t]here is no doubt that the
regulation of minors' access to obscene material is a compelling interest." Se. Booksellers Ass'n v.
McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 781 (D.S.C. 2005).
104. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666-67; Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 781-86. Because the
statute failed the least restrictive means prong of the narrowly tailored test there was no need to address
the second prong: whether there is a close nexus between the regulation and the compelling interest.
See Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
105. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666-70.
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requiring Internet content providers at the sending end to prevent the dissemination
of harmful materials to children to the parental action of filtering the harmful
material at the receiving end."° The Court compared a public action, wherein the
government requires specific conduct from Internet providers, to a private action,
wherein individuals take certain protective steps. In his dissent, Justice Breyer
recognized that this comparison was inappropriate:
Conceptually speaking, the presence of filtering software is not an
alternative legislative approach to the problem of protecting
children from exposure to commercial pornography. Rather, it is
part of the status quo, i.e., the backdrop against which Congress
enacted the present statute. It is always true, by definition, that the
status quo is less restrictive than a new regulatory law. It is
always less restrictive to do nothing than to do something. But
"doing nothing" does not address the problem Congress sought to
address-namely, that, despite the availability of filtering
software, children were still being exposed to harmful material on
the Internet.'07
In short, Justice Breyer believes that for a regulation to be the least restrictive
means for accomplishing the compelling government interest, it need only be the
least restrictive possible legislative solution.
Thus, the Ashcroft majority's lengthy discussion of the comparable
effectiveness of age verification and blocking methods (regulation at the source)
versus filtering software (private action at the receiving end)"0 8 was inappropriate.
Encouraging the use of filters at the receiving end would not be a regulation but
merely a government initiative advocating a certain private action. 09 This
"alternative," therefore, has no place in the least restrictive means analysis. Courts
should not restrict the public means by which legislatures can deal with societal
problems even if a private method of dealing with the problem would be just as
effective and less restrictive of free speech. The courts' actions strip the legislature
of control in an area where the government has a compelling interest on which it
should be permitted to take affirmative action.
The difficulty of applying the least restrictive means test presumably arose
from the unique nature of the Internet and the resulting difficulty of regulating its
content. If the scenarios in Ashcrofl and Southeast Booksellers are compared to a
106. Id. at 664-70.
107. Id. at 684 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108. The Southeast Booksellers court also compared these age verification and blocking methods.
See Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 781-86.
109. The Ashcroft majority emphasized "the argument that filtering software is not an available
alternative because Congress may not require it to be used... carries little weight, because Congress
undoubtedly may act to encourage the use of filters." Ashcrofl, 542 U.S. at 669. The Court went on to
say that "[t]he need for parental cooperation does not automatically disqualify a proposed less restrictive
alternative." Id. (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000)).
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pre-Internet situation, the flaws in the courts' reasoning become apparent. Consider
a statute that prohibits the sale of adult magazines to individuals under the age of
seventeen."' To comply with the statute, vendors of pornographic material would
have to request identification from patrons to verify their age."' Assuming some
adults will lack identification or refuse to sacrifice their anonymity by showing
identification, the statute will keep some individuals from their constitutional right
to receive such protected speech. Requiring the government to forgo the regulation
and instead encourage parents to make sure that their minor children are not
purchasing adult magazines may be less chilling to free speech. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court would certainly uphold the statute if it were challenged on First
Amendment grounds. In applying the least restrictive means test, the Court would
simply ask whether any other regulation could prevent the sale of pornography to
minors as effectively as posing these burdens on would-be adult purchasers. The
Court would likely find that other alternatives are not as effective. Legislatures
should be able to address compelling interests through regulations that may
sometimes burden fundamental rights, even when private actors have the option to
effectively address those interests. Disallowing government regulation whenever
private actors are already addressing a government interest denies the government
the autonomy to directly address its own compelling interests.
Another issue that arose with regard to the least restrictive means test in both
Ashcroft and Southeast Booksellers was the statutes' relative ineffectiveness."2
Many pornographic Internet sites originate from abroad and the statutes only
regulated sites originating in the United States. "3 The Southeast Booksellers court
wrote that "the inability to curtail the flow of sexually-explicit materials from
abroad is a fatal flaw in statutes [of this type]."'" 4 While this limitation is
problematic, the federal and state governments should still have the authority to
regulate the conduct of individuals in this country or state, notwithstanding their
inability to regulate the conduct of individuals in other countries. The government
is merely attempting to take a step in the direction of solving a problem, and courts
should not block this effort simply because legislation cannot completely solve the
problem.
110. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (1965). The United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of this statute in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968).
111. The New York Law at issue in Ginsberg indicated it was a violation to "'knowingly"' sell
to a minor "'any picture' that "'depicts nudity"' and 'is harmful to minors."' Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at
633 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h).
112. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 565,667 (2004); Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (citing
Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667).
113. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 667; Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (citing Ashcroft,
542 U.S. at 667).
114. Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
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V. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A LINGERING ISSUE
In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court struck down COPA entirely on First
Amendment grounds." 5 The Southeast Booksellers court relied primarily on the
First Amendment, but also held that the South Carolina statute violated the
Commerce Clause." 6 The Southeast Booksellers court determined "the Act [was]
invalid because it place[d] an undue burden on interstate commerce by regulating
commerce occurring wholly outside of South Carolina.""' 7 This determination
raises the possibility that the Internet is beyond the reach of state regulation. Indeed,
one court has likened "'[t]he content of the internet ... to the content of the night
sky. One state simply cannot block a constellation from the view of its own citizens
without blocking or affecting the view of the citizens of other states.""'" Thus,
given its nature, the Internet appears to be beyond legislative control at the state
level. One commentator argued "the dormant Commerce Clause argument, if
accepted, threatens to invalidate nearly every state regulation of Internet
communications.... This explains why the dormant Commerce Clause has been
called a 'nuclear bomb of a legal theory' against state Internet regulations."' '9 Thus,
the current state of First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
leaves protection of minors almost entirely to parents. Thus, it may be necessary to
reevaluate the Dormant Commerce Clause as it relates to the Internet, or for the
Supreme Court to act with greater deference to federal Internet regulations so as to
avoid the Commerce Clause issue entirely. Something must change if legislatures
are to have the ability to police the evasive world of the Internet.
115. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 670-73.
116. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786-88 (D.S.C. 2005). The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York struck down a similar statute, basing its
holding almost entirely on the Commerce Clause:
First, the... "Commerce Clause... precludes the application of a state statute to
commerce that takes place wholly outside the State's borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the state." Second,... a statute that directly controls
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent
limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the
statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. The critical inquiry
is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the State." Finally, "the practical effect of the statute must be
evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also
by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate
regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but
many or every, State adopted similar legislation."
Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations omitted) (quoting
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
117. Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
118. Id. (quoting PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 240 (4th Cir. 2004)).
119. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110
YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Ashcroft and Southeast Booksellers decisions trigger a serious problem in
South Carolina that has already occurred in a number of other states.12' Namely, the
courts have eviscerated the legislature's power to protect minors from Internet
pornography and have forced them to rely on parental intervention. Because the
pervasiveness of the Internet is growing every day, children are increasingly more
likely to use the Internet on a regular basis. Research indicates that many minors
are more knowledgeable about the Internet than their parents.' Furthermore, some
parents undoubtedly have the "not my child" mentality and thus find it unnecessary
to purchase software that blocks dangerous materials on the Internet. By refusing
to allow legislatures to criminalize the dissemination of harmful material to
children, the courts are protecting not only those who merely post harmful material
on the Internet, but also those who target children for exploitative purposes. The
courts should afford greater respect to the role of the legislatures and allow them
to fulfill their responsibility to create laws that address the government's
compelling interests.
William H. Jordan
120. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding a
Vermont act aimed at preventing minors' access to sexually-explicit Internet material unconstitutional);
ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding a New Mexico act aimed at
preventing minors' access to sexually-explicit Internet material unconstitutional); Am. Library Ass'n
v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding a New York act aimed at preventing minors'
access to sexually-explicit Internet material unconstitutional).
121. Todd A. Nist, Finding the Right Approach: A Constitutional Alternative for Shielding Kids
from Harmful Materials Online, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 478 n. 117 (2004) (noting that "parents often have
less knowledge about the Internet compared to their kids" and that research indicates "'[o]nly 23% of
parents say they know more about the Internet than their child does' (quoting AMARACH CONSULTING,
INTERNET ADVISORY BOARD RESEARCH OF INTERNET DOWNSIDE ISSUES ii (2001),
http://www.ispai.ie/docs%5camarach.pdf)).
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